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I Introduction
The debate about the future of welfare states and
social policies in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries' has
a number of relatively well-defined characteristics:
It has a clear focus: the notion that most citizens
in OECD countries have enjoyed relatively high
levels of (state-provided) social protection; that the
future is likely to be different; and that it will be
characterised by greater 'privatisation', notably
more market-based self-provisioning, and greater
use of non-state agencies through contractual
arrangements. The debate centres around the
extent and nature of these privatisation processes.
Some relatively tangible forces persuade even
the defenders of core welfare state principles that
reform is necessary - if only for fiscal reasons.
These include the implications of ageing popula-
tions; pressure on public health spending resulting
from medical advances; the high cost of labour-
intensive personal services that dominate social
spending; and more contentious, the alleged grow-
ing tax resistance of the median voter.
The case that 'something must be done' for
these tangible reasons is often integrated (or con-
fused) with a similar argument about the far less
tangible globalisation imperative: the argument
that (economic) globalisation - understood as
greater international capital mobility and greater
economic openness generally - empowers con-
trollers of capital in their dealings with states and
organised labour (see below). It is believed that
these globalisation processes will almost inevitably
lead to some combination of: reduced fiscal com-
mitment to social provision, less regulation of
employment conditions, and a greater role for the
market across the board.
This debate is primarily retrospective and
defensive in tone. Even among the proponents of
radical reform, there are few outright enthusiasts
for a future world of decentralised, plural and pri-
vatised provision. The tone even of the enthusiasts
is predominantly one of realism. There is a strong
tendency to cling on to what is already there.
(y) Recent events in (predominantly) middle income
countries outside the OECD - the disastrous
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collapse of social provision in most former commu-
nist states; reform of social security funds in Latin
America; and the accumulating evidence that
income inequality is increasing in many countries
(UNCTAD 1997: chapter 3) - have chimed in suffi-
ciently with this image of the welfare state under
threat to support the view that there is a generic,
global 'crisis' of welfare provision rooted in globali-
sation processes.
(vi) Despite disagreement over values, facts, projec-
tions and policy preferences, most participants in
the debate share some assumptions about context.
The different contenders have a common under-
standing about when and where they will turn up
to do battle. Three elements of that consensus are
relevant to our concerns:
The erosive effects assumption: the expectation
that the various processes of change will have
erosive effects on income distribution, the poor,
the power of states (in relation to capital), social
spending, andlor the capacity or willingness of
states to protect the poor. The political project is
therefore primarily defensive: to protect against
forces rooted in markets and technology; and/or
to mitigate their adverse impacts.
The state capacity assumption: it is taken for
granted that states perform their basic functions:
control and tax populations, exercise a monop-
oly of organised force, and make authoritative
decisions about the allocation of public
resources. The social policy debate is about
whether states that perform these basic func-
tions should or can operate in the more discre-
tionary area of social policy.
The biased architecture assumption: the more stri-
dently neo-liberal OECD states (New Zealand,
UK, USA) have been actively promoting the
changes in the architecture of the state that are
usually labelled 'new public management'
(NPM). Some of the key components of NPM
include: an emphasis on measuring outcomes of
public activities and obtaining value for taxpay-
ers' money; contracting out of service provision
and 'publicprivate partnerships; widening the
impact of commercial forces and principles in
internal operations; and greater accountability to
service consumers through performance
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indicators and choice. In unequal societies, the
introduction of NPM has high potential to dis-
advantage the poor: to justify reduced social
provision, and to empower more vocal and
organised groups of citizens at the expense of the
poor. There is a belief that those struggling to
preserve the welfare state and to resist the tide of
NPM are fighting the same battle.
My main purpose here is not to question whether
these assumptions are valid in relation to the OECD
countries. As political argument, it appears right to
argue for the restoration of a pattern of social provi-
sion that commands wide public support and is
clearly under threat. Linking the OECD situation
with that of former Communist countries is strate-
gically sensible. The spectre of the wholesale col-
lapse of social provision in parts of the former
Soviet Bloc illustrates graphically what might be in
store. To mobilise resistance to further welfare state
cuts, it makes sense to argue that the common
enemy - globalisation - is likely to worsen life for
ordinary people everywhere. But I believe that this
way of presenting the situation can be misleading in
relation to poor countries: not just because it is in
some sense wrong, but also because it simply
directs attention to the wrong issues. Development
studies specialists need to perform their most tradi-
tional role: to judge whether intellectual theories,
fads and concepts rooted in the concerns of the
richer part of the world are relevant to and realistic
in the context of poor countries. In this case, I am
more than sceptical. In adopting an OECD-based
agenda or definition of the problem, we would be
arguing on the wrong terrain. Each of the three
common assumptions of the OECD-based social
policy debate, listed above, is wrong and/or mis-
leading, sometimes in relation to the recent history
of the OECD countries themselves, and certainly in
relation to the poor countries of the world.
(i) Globalisation need not erode the capacity or
willingness of states to protect the poor. Looking at
both the histories of the evolution of OECD welfare
states, and of the extension of state activities in all
parts of the world in the light of the notion of polit-
ical responses to livelihood risk, we discover a very
different story This is the story of (effective) politi-
cal pressures on states to expand activities to help
protect against the livelihood risks associated with
'openness'. Globalisation has tended to boost rather
than shrink states in the past. There is as yet no rea-
son to believe that the future will be radically dif-
ferent (see Section 2).
Many poor people are (nominally) governed by
states that do not fulfil their core governance func-
tions. In such cases, the main obstacles to effective
social policy do not lie in the absence of the right
'policy decisions': there are deeper obstacles to
effective social provision. Solutions lie mainly in
'better governance' across the board - increasing the
effectiveness and accountability of states - rather
than in reforms in specific sectors (see Section 3).
It is not helpful to treat the new public man-
agement as inimical to effective social policy in poor
countries. NPM is a symbol and embodiment of a
broader change that is taking place in the architec-
ture of OECD states: a relative shift of emphasis
from taxing and spending activities to rule-making.
The frequent but piecemeal introduction of NPM
principles in poor countries is likely to continue.
The problem for poor states will remain a dearth of
regulatory capacity of any kind. Ameliorating that
problem is as urgent in relation to social policy as it
is in other sectors. In many poor countries, a great
deal of health and education is already provided by
commercial and non-state agencies that are virtually
unregulated. If NPM helps to draw more explicit
attention to the issue of regulation and potential
institutional solutions, then it may play a positive
role (see Section 4).
2 The Social Policy Consequences
of Open Economies
Two propositions lie at the heart of pessimistic
interpretations of the likely effects of globalisation
on the capacity and willingness of states to conduct
pro-poor social policies:
that economic openness is reducing the eco-
nomic power and scope of the state (in relation
to capital, in particular)
that the reduction in the actual and potential
economic role of the state will have especially
adverse effects on poorer people, because the
more wealthy (and influential) will abandon the
poor politically, and seek their own salvation in
private, market provision of the social goods that
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might otherwise have been publicly provided.
More broadly and simply, the welfare state is
understood primarily as a set of policies for
redistributing resources between income groups
('classes').
The redistibutional (or 'labourist') interpretation of
the welfare state is especially popular in the
Anglophone OECD countries and, even more
marked among people with trade union and leftist
sympathies. At the extreme, the welfare state is pre-
sented as the product of the struggle of the working
class, through the trade union movement and
labour parties. Since both these champions are in
decline, it may be concluded that welfareism is left
without powerful defenders. We know that this
'labourist' interpretation of the rise of the welfare
state is a considerable simplification (Skocpol and
Amenta 1986). It is valid at a high level of general-
ity: industrial nations have developed the most
extensive welfare states, and the political pressure
from organised labour has played a significant role.
However, attempts to explain variations in welfare
state provision in terms of variations in labour
movements have not been very successful (Baldwin
1990: 8). We know that two other forces have been
very influential in shaping the character and extent
of welfare states:
The imperatives and strategies of state elites. It is
better to flog to death than to ignore the point that
modern welfareism was introduced by Bismarck in
order to undercut the growing power of the German
trade unions and the Social Democratic Party There
are plenty of parallels in the contemporary world,
notably in East Asia, where 'Welfare programmes
were overwhelmingly introduced by those in power
rather than as a result of popular demand' (White
and Goodman 1998: 15).2 Indeed, the
'Anglophone-North European' cxpencnce of exten-
sive welfareism introduced mainly by labour par-
ties3 is notable less for its typicality than for the
wide influence it has on understandings of what a
'proper' welfare state looks like.4
The societal interests and politics dnving the
development of welfareism in vVestern Europe are
best charactensed not in terms of differences and
redistribution between 'classes' (i.e. poor versus
rich scenarios), but in terms of vulnerability to risk,
And risk is no great respecter of class position, as
conventionally understood. In the words of the
prime exponent of the risk-focused interpretation
of the politics of European welfare states:
Risk categories have sometimes coincided with
entire classes as they are defined in terms other
than the actuarial. The interests of the industrial
proletariat both as a class and as a risk category
have tended to be consistent - a coincidence
that founds the widely held view that its con-
cerns in particular have lain behind social poi-
icy reform of the most redistributive son.
Nevertheless, on the occasions when workers'
interests did change, the new approach was
determined not by their relation to the means of
production, but by their stake in the means of
security
When the German and French labor movements
shifted from favoring to opposing solidaristic
pension and health insurance legislation in the
1960s and 1970s, it was the transformation of
the working class from a winner to a loser in
social insurance's redistributive calculus that
explains the volteface. Equally often, on the
other hand, risk categories have cut across more
general social groupings. The middle class in
particular has embraced a multitude of risk cate-
gories with divergent interests that explain its
vacillating approach to redistribution.
Depending on which, if any, risk category won
the upper hand to speak for the class as a whole,
it has sometimes favored, sometimes resisted,
solidaristic reform. As frequently however, the
middle class has fragmented into its actuarial
components, taking different and mutually con-
tradictory approaches. In no sense has the bour-
geoisie historically been a consistently
unsolidaristic class' (Baldwin 1990: 17-18).
What are the implications for poor countries of
these more nuanced interpretations of the politics
of OECD welfare systems? The fact that states have
often played a leading role in creating and extend-
ing welfare systems is not generally of much conso-
lation to the poor in contemporary poor countries.
Direct pressures on states to extend social provision
are relatively muted these days. There is no global
threat of communism. Concerns about the inability
to recruit sufficient healthy soldiers that played
such a role in Britain a century ago (Searle 1971)
24
ring few bells when sophisticated weaponry plays
the major role in shaping the outcome of armed
conflicts. The imperatives of the 'competition state'
to extend and improve popular education in order
to boost national economic performance bear heav-
ily on most contemporary OECD states and a num-
ber of industrialising middle income countries, but
are weak in most of the poor world.
A more optimistic view of potential political sup-
port for public social provision in poor countries is
obtained from this risk-centric analysis which sug-
gests that political pressures for governments to
'intervene' in markets are likely to emanate from
(perceptions of) market-induced risks to groups of
citizens. One might hypothesise that, all else being
equal, the degree of market risk will determine the
extent of political pressures on governments to
intervene to ameliorate that risk. Further, given that
globalisation (economic openness) is likely to
increase actual or perceived risk, one might also
hypothesise that economic openness will tend to
increase the degree of state intervention in the econ-
omy And there is powerful statistical evidence that
these hypotheses are valid. Among the OECD coun-
tries, the rate of growth of the public share of the
economy - measured as the ratio of tax revenue to
GDP - was significantly shaped by the degree of
economic openness, a finding believed to be related
to the livelihood risks associated with openness
(Cameron 1978). Recent work by Rodrik (1998)
extends that finding to a larger sample of countries
at all income levels, and provides us with a more
convincing analysis of the causal sequences. Rodrik
shows that more precise measures of the risk asso-
ciated with economic openness - the volatility of
the terms of trade, and the extent to which their
exports are concentrated on a few products - are
better predictors of the growth of the state's share of
the economy than are measures of economic open-
ness per se. He provides evidence that, whereas gov-
ernments of richer countries tend to respond to the
political pressures to cope with economic uncer-
tainty by expanding social spending as we conceive
it, governments of poorer countries tend to expand
government consumption. Rodrik's explanation of
the difference is that governments of poor countries
lack the administrative apparatus to undertake
compensatory social spending. They use the tools
they have at hand: government jobs and 'develop-
ment' programmes.
I find convincing Rodrik's explanation of why gov-
ernments of poor countries tend to use these 'indi-
rect social policies' in response to political pressures
to provide protection against economic risk. At the
least, this supplements the crude and tautologous
'rent-seeking' interpretations of the size of the state
- that rent-seeking drives all growth of state activi-
ties. It would be surprising if these 'indirect' social
policies were as efficient or well targeted as more
tailored alternatives. But that is not the main con-
cern here. Especially when combined with the risk-
centric explanation of the politics of the welfare
state, Rodnk's analysis provides us with a very dif-
ferent perspective on the political implications of
globalisation for social policy than the conventional
account.
The essence of the conventional account is a story
of how increased capital mobility is undermining
the capacity of governments to take leftist or pro-
gressive policy positions, to redistribute assets or
income to the poor, or to expand social provision.
The underlying arguments rest on the notion that
globalisation has produced a relative shift of power
away from states to the controllers of capital.
Capital has become more mobile internationally.
The greater the efforts that governments make to
tax or redistribute income or capital, preserve or
increase social protection, or influence private sec-
tor investment, the more they will be 'punished' by
capital. Capitalists do not need to get together to
bribe governments or conspire against them. They
will individually reduce or threaten to reduce
investments where regimes lack 'realism'. The spec-
tre of declining tax revenues, rising unemployment
and falling political support will persuade most
governments to accept reality: to reduce business
taxes, cancel promises to redistribute land, dilute
proposals to extend employee rights, and postpone
plans to provide a basic income to all destitute
households.6
Most established arguments against this interpreta-
tion of the political consequences of globalisation
focus on the extent to which capital and capitalists
need effective states (e.g. to enforce property
rights) (Evans 1997; Weiss 1998). To the extent
that these alternative arguments are valid, they are
not very encouraging from the perspective of our
concerns with social policy in poor countries.
Even if, like Rieger and Liebfried (1998), one can
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make a conincing case that controllers of capital
wish poor states to pursue active social policies for
reasons of political and labour force stability, or to
reduce political obstacles to economic adjustment,7
one may be left with a fragile sphere of social policy
at the mercy of the perceived, indirect needs of cap-
ital. The risk-centric explanation of the politics of
social policy suggests a more direct, powerful and
consistent source of pressure for active social poli-
cies: the concerns of citizens of poor countries to
find protection against market risk. Unless for some
unexplained reason the future is to be significantly
different from the past, any increases in globalisa-
tion and economic openness will tend to increase
the intensity of those pressures. Then add the fact
that unprecedented pressures and incentives for
poor countries to become more democratic are inte-
gral features of contemporary globalisation. Unlike
previous waves of democratisation, that which
developed in the 1980s has not foundered on inter-
national geo-political rivalries. This third wave of
democratisation has been unusually vigorous and
sustained. It shows no signs of receding. The stabil-
isation of democracy is likely to intensify the polit-
ical pressures on governments to provide citizens
with protection against the risks inherent in the
global market economy8
Possibly the biggest threat posed by globalisation to
active social policy lies in our minds: in the fact that
we have been re-educated to believe that public
action to reduce poverty, inequality or insecurity is
intrinsically very difficult for both political and
technical reasons, and is unlikely to succeed very
often (see Moore 1999). vVe have to try to separate
out globalisation as ideology from globalisation as
fact, and then examine carefully the likely conse-
quences of the facts. Some are distinctly gloomy
There is evidence that increased exposure of labour
to international competition tends to reduce wage
rates and worsen employment conditions in many
places (Wood 1994). However, that is very different
from the case that globalisation undermines the
political capacity of states to pursue social policies.
On that I am much more sceptical, and corre-
spondingly uneasy at the notion that attentions of
poor countries are best absorbed in defending a sta-
tus quo - a level of social provision that provides a
foundation on which more can be built. In poor
countries, the foundations are all too often missing
or too shaky to bear much weight. In particular, it
is fact, not just neo-liberal propaganda, that in
many poor countries social policy has long been
oriented more towards relatively privileged sectors
than towards the poor' (Huber 1995: 1).
3 The Barely Instrumental State
The debate over social policy within the OECD
assumes the basic instrumentality of states. It is
taken for granted that states perform their basic
functions: to control and command the loyalties of
their populations, tax them, exercise a monopoly of
organised force, and make authoritative decisions
about the allocation of public resources. Discussion
about instrumentality deals with second order
issues of a principal-agent' nature. Do children's
homes really provide the kind of service expected of
them? What combination of facilities best provides
for needs - state institutions or contractual arrange-
ments with non-state institutions? The big ques-
tions about the extent and character of social
policies are debated either on normative, ideologi-
cal grounds or on fiscal-cum-political grounds.
Both types of argument assume that states are basi-
cally competent.
The OECD states are broadly similar to one another.
They are relatively effective, but also relatively
accountable to their citizens. On average, poor coun-
tries are under the formal authority of states that are
relatively ineffective. States are unable to rule many
of their nominal citizens or to authoritatively pursue
any kind of collective interest. The state apparatus
does not immunise, educate, tax, police, or protect
many citizens, and is unable to police its borders.
These states are relatively arbitrary, despotic and
unaccountable. Even those that are formally democ-
ratic are often ruled in an extra-legal fashion, and
lack democratic substance (O'Donnell 1999). Why
should so many states be relatively ineffective? There
are six main explanations:
(i) Many Third World states are both relatively
recent and the product of simple, brutal (colonial)
conquest. This is especially true of sub-Saharan
Africa, where colonial conquest was recent and
swift, took place in a context where the differences
between conquerors and victims were unusually
large, where the process of redrawing the borders of
pre-colonial polities was especially radical, and
where there was relatively little co-option of local
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elites into the system of colonial rule (Young 1994).
Colonial and post-colonial states were often rooted
more in the arid soil of coercion and conquest than
in the rich compost of history, tradition, co-opera-
tion and consent. The states of the rich countries
have had longer to mature.
Once the now-rich states became more power-
ful, they became 'puppet-masters' in relation to the
rulers of poor states. During the Cold War in par-
ticular, many Third World governments were able
to profit from a bargaining position in relation to
great power rivalry Exploitation of these rivalries
could generate valuable support from abroad,
including the active military back-up that might
reduce internal political support to an optional
extra rather than a basic necessity for effective rule
(Tilly 1992: chapter 7; Luckham 1996). States have
been rooted more in external than internal
resources and support.
Former European colonies became indepen-
dent after the operative rules of the international
state system had effectively been rewritten with the
creation of the United Nations. The previous norm
was for recognition of statehood - effective control
of territory and populations and a demonstrated
capacity to resist rivals. After 1945 in particular, this
ceased to be the de facto condition for recognition
by other states. To be the legitimate successor of
colonial rule was itself adequate to guarantee the
recognition and material resources, including inter-
national aid, that accrue to those holding govern-
mental power. And in most of the ex-colonial
world, but most strikingly in sub-Saharan Africa
(until recently), Darwinian processes of inter-state
competition were not only discouraged, but posi-
tively ruled out by the new international and
regional state systems. Governments that lost effec-
tïve control of the populations and territories over
which they nominally ruled did not as a matter of
course fear wholesale predation on the part of their
neighbours. Conflict was almost all internal (Tilly
1992: 201). The incentives for states to maintain
control of their territories and populations - to rule
as well as to reign - have thus diminished in favour
of incentives to nourish connections to the interna-
tional state system (Jackson 1990).
Poor states depend to an unhealthy degree on
'unearned income', and not on tax revenues earned
from the mass of their own citizens.9 State income
is 'earned' to the extent that the state apparatus has
to put in effort with citizens in order to get its
money There are two criteria we can use to judge
how far state income is earned. One is organisa-
tional effort. I-low large, elaborate, differentiated
and efficient is the bureaucratic apparatus that the
state deploys to collect its income? The other is rec-
iprocity I-low far are citizens obtaining some recip-
rocal services in return for their tax contributions?
Many contemporary poor states are heavily depen-
dent on mineral royalties.1° Despite relatively high
average per capita incomes, these countries notori-
ously and consistently score low on measures of
political stability democracy or accountability They
generally have large military and police establish-
ments but poor quality public bureaucracies. In
sum, their governments are both unaccountable
and ineffective. Dependence on unearned mineral
revenues helps bring about these political outcomes
through mechanisms that can only be summarised
here:
The state apparatus, and the people who control
it, have a 'guaranteed' source of income that
makes them independent of their citizens (' sub-
jects'?).
It is tempting to try to take over the state by
force: it is much easier to squeeze a quick for-
tune out of an oil well than out of a hundred
thousand taxpayers. Politics in mineral states
tends to coup-ism.
There is little incentive to establish an efficient
public service. The task of raising revenue from
mineral facilities requires few specialists.
Incentives to create an efficient public bureau-
cracy will be concentrated on the military and
intelligence apparatuses.
The failure to tax the bulk of the population -
and thereby bring them into the ambit of a reg-
ular civilian bureaucracy - leaves the state vul-
nerable to the (armed) organisational challenge
of competitors - guerrillas, private armies, and
religious movements.
Where public revenues come from a small num-
ber of concentrated sources it is relatively easy
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for revenue and expenditure to be concealed. If
a legislature exists, it has limited capacity to
exercise oversight over the state because it has
incomplete knowledge of - let alone control
over - how state and quasi-state agencies raise
and spend money
Absent the point about the temptations to coup-
ism, and much the same could be said about the
politics of highly aid-dependent states."
(y) There are vicious circle effects stemming from
the co-existence of weak and effective states in a
global economy in which large rewards are obtained
from (international) trafficking in narcotics (in par-
ticular - also arms). \Vhen narcotics are produced
(and processed) within the territorial domains of
weak states, the profits fund powerful trading-mili-
tary-political networks that are either in opposition
to the formal authority apparatus of the state or
undermining it from within. The illegal narcotics
business has less corrosive impacts on states that are
already well institutionalised.
(vi) Very high levels of inequality in many poor
countries (UNCTAD 1997: chapter 3) make the
maintenance of social cohesion and political order
an especially challenging task.
How should all this affect our understanding of
social policy in poor countries? First, it reminds us
of the extent to which many poor states fail to pro-
vide basic public services. Some national political-
economic systems manage to achieve high levels of
human development at low average income levels;
others with higher incomes perform badly in gener-
ating human development. Statistical analysis of
cross-national variations in longevity, education,
and literacy provides an explanation Moore, Leavy,
et al. 1999). For 61 developing countries between
1980 and 1995, a measure of the efficiency with
which national politicaleconomic sYstems convert
GNP per capita into human development for their
citizens, or relative income conversion efficiency
(RICE), was calculated. Four variables explain vari-
ations in RICE in a consistent and robust fashion:
Population density: it is easier and cheaper to
provide health and education services to
densely-clustered populations. This is a fact of
life, and has no particular policy implications.
All else being equal, countries located in West
Africa have lower RICE scores than countries
located elsewhere.12
A composite measure of the quality of govern-
ment institutions, produced for international
investors, turns out to be significantly but nega-
tively correlated with RICE. In other words,
countries with governance institutions that are
attractive to international investors tend to per-
form badly at converting material resources into
human development.
The 'unearned income' hypothesis set out above
was validated to the extent that we were able to
test it. We have no adequate statistics of the
extent of government dependence on unearned
income, and used as proxies the degree of
dependence of national economies on aid
inflows and mineral production. Levels of aid
exercised a depressing effect on RICE only at the
extremes of high aid dependence. A large min-
eral sector, however, exercised a more consistent
and statistically significant negative effect on
RICE.
In sum, basic features of many poor states exercise
a significant and negative effect on their capacity
and incentive to provide basic public services to
poor citizens. These basic governance problems -
low administrative capacity, political and fiscal
autonomy from citizens, external orientation -
should be central to any debate about social policy
in poor countries.
4 The Future Architecture of the
State
Within the OECD countries, there has been a close
connection between (a) the (neo-liberal) intellectual
andlor fiscal attack on levels of welfare provision
and (b) the introduction of consistent changes in
the architecture of the state that are usually labelled
'new public management' (NPM).13 The most stri-
dently neo-liberal OECD states (New Zealand, UK,
USA) have also been the most active and consistent
users of NPM ideas. There has been a clear political
synergy between the two processes: the fragmenta-
tion of public sector labour market institutions
inherent in the practice of NPM has weakened the
public sector trade unions, which had been behind
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increasing public spending on the social sectors.
Within the OECD countries, it is easy to identify
resistance to the extension of NPM practices with a
'progressive' attitude toward public social spending.
In Chile such reforms have indeed led to inequali-
ties in health and education provision, and a system
of income support for the very poor that is
(ïntended to be) highly stigmatising (Huber 1995:
19-24). The relevance of the Chilean case is how-
ever unclear as it is not typical of poor countries.
For most poor countries, it makes little sense to
associate a progressive social policy with resistance
to NPM. There are four reasons:
The notion that social services either should be,
or recently have been, provided by the state, does
not make historical or strategic sense in the context
of poor countries. It is not even very accurate for
OECD countries (see Salamon 1987). We do not
have good aggregate figures for poor countries, but
those that we do have indicate that states are not the
dominant providers (see Robinson and White 1997:
13). We need to assume that sources of social pro-
vision are multiple and likely to remain so.
The gradual spread of NPM ideas and practices
to poorer countries appears inevitable. It is not clear
that it would be desirable in principle, or possible
in practice, to slow this process. I do not make these
statements because I am a strong advocate of NPM.
Behind them lie several subsidiary propositions and
impressions, including that NPM is spreading to
poor countries mostly in a decentralised and
autonomous fashion. The main aid and develop-
ment agencies that one might have expected to be
vigorous proponents of NPM have in practice been
guarded and sceptical.'4 In Latin America much of
the initiative appears to come from politicians and
public servants who have been exposed to interna-
tional ideas through American education. This
process of 'autonomous' spread of NPM in poor
countries is fragmented and piecemeal, with differ-
ing combinations of elements of NPM being intro-
duced relatively randomly within particular
agencies or programmes. The fragmented nature of
NPM experiments increasingly reflects prevalent
ideas about NPM in the countries where it has been
most vigorously pursued. It is no longer a radical,
distinct set of ideas and practices in clear contrast to
the existing alternative: it has become the norm,
and a broad menu rather than a set meal.
This 'normalisation' of NPM in (some) OECD coun-
tries reflects the fact that it is not the sole recent
innovation in the architecture of the state. It is a
component of a broader shift: from a 'positive'
(direct-provider, taxer and spender) to more regula-
tory (rule-maker and enforcer) state (Majone 1997).
Much NPM practice can best be conceived as a
move towards more regulatory relationships
between operational agencies and policy-cum-
financing 'ministries' within the state apparatus.
And it appears increasingly clear that this change in
the architecture of states toward regulatory activities
is driven principally by advances in electronic infor-
mation, data processing and communication tech-
nologies. lt is becoming cheaper and easier for
central public agencies to monitor performance,
disseminate results, measure consumer satisfaction,
cost precisely, assess alternative modes of achieving
policy goals, and negotiate with suppliers. In sum,
transactions costs are falling, and traditional, hier-
archical arrangements for providing public services,
that economise on transactions costs, are losing
their relative advantage. It is increasingly possible to
run public services through more market-like rela-
tions, with the financing/policy agency concentrat-
ing on regulation. Regulation may be internal to the
state apparatus, e.g. the regulation of local by cen-
tral government, of operating agencies by financ-
ing/policy agencies, or 'external', e.g. the regulation
of contractors, banks, companies, trade unions,
traffic by government agencies.
(iii) Even within the universe of the OECD states
and richer countries generally, there is no unique
association between effective social policy and the
more 'positive' state. The East Asian capitalist
nations have, in recent decades, provided rela-
tively effective social services with the state play-
ing a stronger regulatory role than in most OECD
states. 15
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(iv) The introduction of NPM practices - along with
the privatisation of utilities - tends to draw atten-
tion to the regulation issue in general.
There is a tendency to discuss the issue of the 'role
of the state' mainly in terms of who will provide ser-
vices - public agencies, NGOs, churches, commer-
cial contractors, etc. - leaving the regulation issue
aside. This emphasis is wrong.16 Poor states already
perform poorly in basic regulation functions.
Building regulations are widely flouted. Medicines
and agro-chemicals are not controlled. The effec-
tiveness of schoolteachers is only loosely moni-
tored. The need for more and better regulation can
only increase in the social policy domain as medical
treatments become more diverse and complex and as
an increasing array of commercial agents. local or
transnational, become more influential and seductive
in their offers to provide private pensions, health
insurance, health treatment, education and security
I am neither endorsing nor condemning the adop-
tion of NPM practices in poor countries, but mak-
ing a different point. In poor countries, the direct
provision of social services through a hierarchical
state organisation is not the norm. That is not the
terrain to be defended. Services are more likely to
be provided commercially, by non-commercial,
non-state agencies (mainly religious organisations),
or not at all. The role of non-state agencies, and of
state agencies working under 'internal' contracts, is
likely to increase - because there are powerful tech-
nological and economic pressures in that direction.
All these arrangements require a great deal of regu-
lation. The state neither has nor should have a
monopoly of regulation: markets can also provide
that. But the state should play a major role. In poor
countries, effective state regulation is very much
under-provided. Much more is needed, indepen-
dently of the question of whether it is commercial,
civil society, NGO or operational state agencies that
need to be regulated.
Notes
1 Some of the views summarised here are from Clayton
and Pontussson (1998); Esping-Andersen (1994);
Pierson (1996); and Rieger and Liebfried (1998).
See also Kwon (1999).
Although the British welfare state was established by
the Liberal Party early in the twentieth century they
were competing seriously with the nascent Labour
Party for the votes of organised labour.
For an admission of the way in which this model
shaped his early interpretations of the Japanese
welfare system see Goodman (1999).
Overbye (1995) presents the same argument in a
more formal political economy style.
An excellent account of the political consequences of
the mobility of capital is to be found in Winters
(1994, 1996: chapter 1). Winters is not himself a
proponent of globalisation arguments.
They are likely to do so if the cost is ultimately borne
mainly by labour. And this, Adrian Wood has
suggested to me, is a likely outcome if one assumes
competitive international markets.
More generally, national politics still significantly
affect the ways in which social policies change under
globalisation pressures (Castles and Pierson 1997).
The concept of the 'unearned income' of states, and
its political consequences, derives from my own
work in progress. See Moore (1998).
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